Friday, November 14, 2008



Herbert Spencer

Birth
27 April, 1820
Death
8 December, 1903
School/tradition
Evolutionism, Positivism,
Main interests
Evolution, Positivism, Laissez-faire, utilitarianism
Notable ideas
Survival of the fittest
Influenced by
Charles Darwin, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, George Henry Lewes, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Thomas Huxley
Influenced
Charles Darwin, Henry Sidgwick, William Graham Sumner, Thorstein Veblen, Emile Durkheim, Alfred Marshall, Henri Bergson, Nikolay Mikhaylovsky, Auberon Herbert
Herbert Spencer (April 27, 1820December 8, 1903) was an English philosopher; prominent classical liberal political theorist; and sociological theorist of the Victorian era.
Spencer developed an all-embracing conception of evolution as the progressive development of the physical world, biological organisms, the human mind, and human culture and societies. The lifelong bachelor contributed to a wide range of subjects, including ethics, religion, politics, philosophy, biology, sociology, and psychology.
He is best known for coining the phrase "survival of the fittest," which he did in Principles of Biology (1864), after reading Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species.[1] This term strongly suggests natural selection, yet as Spencer extended evolution into realms of sociology and ethics, he made use of Lamarckism rather than natural selection.

Life
Herbert Spencer was born in Derby, England, on April 27, 1820, the son of William George Spencer (generally called George). Spencer’s father was a religious dissenter who drifted from Methodism to Quakerism, and who seems to have transmitted to his son an opposition to all forms of authority. He ran a school founded on the progressive teaching methods of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and also served as Secretary of the Derby Philosophical Society, a scientific society which had been founded in the 1790s by Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of Charles.
Spencer was educated in empirical science by his father, while the members of the Derby Philosophical Society introduced him to pre-Darwinian concepts of biological evolution, particularly those of Erasmus Darwin and Jean Baptiste Lamarck. His uncle, the Reverend Thomas Spencer, vicar of Hinton Charterhouse near Bath, completed Spencer’s limited formal education by teaching him some mathematics and physics, and enough Latin to enable him to translate some easy texts. Thomas Spencer also imprinted on his nephew his own firmly free-trade and anti-statist political views. Otherwise, Spencer was an autodidact who acquired most of his knowledge from narrowly focused readings and conversations with his friends and acquaintances.
As both an adolescent and a young man Spencer found it difficult to settle to any intellectual or professional discipline. He worked as a civil engineer during the railway boom of the late 1830s, while also devoting much of his time to writing for provincial journals that were nonconformist in their religion and radical in their politics. From 1848 to 1853 he served as sub-editor on the free-trade journal The Economist, during which time he published his first book, Social Statics (1851), which predicted that humanity would shortly become completely adapted to the requirements of living in society with the consequential withering away of the state.
Its publisher, John Chapman, introduced him to his salon which was attended by many of the leading radical and progressive thinkers of the capital, including John Stuart Mill, Harriet Martineau, George Henry Lewes and Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot), with whom he was briefly romantically linked. Spencer himself introduced the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, who would later win fame as 'Darwin’s Bulldog' and who remained his lifelong friend. However it was the friendship of Evans and Lewes that acquainted him with John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic and with Auguste Comte’s Positivism and which set him on the road to his life’s work; he strongly disagreed with Comte.
The first fruit of his friendship with Evans and Lewes was Spencer's second book, Principles of Psychology, published in 1855, which explored a physiological basis for psychology. The book was founded on the fundamental assumption that the human mind was subject to natural laws and that these could be discovered within the framework of general biology. This permitted the adoption of a developmental perspective not merely in terms of the individual (as in traditional psychology), but also of the species and the race. Through this paradigm, Spencer aimed to reconcile the associationist psychology of Mill’s Logic, the notion that human mind was constructed from atomic sensations held together by the laws of the association of ideas, with the apparently more 'scientific' theory of phrenology, which located specific mental functions in specific parts of the brain.
Spencer argued that both these theories were partial accounts of the truth: repeated associations of ideas were embodied in the formation of specific strands of brain tissue, and these could be passed from one generation to the next by means of the Lamarckian mechanism of use-inheritance. The Psychology, he modestly believed, would do for the human mind what Isaac Newton had done for matter. However, the book was not initially successful and the last of the 251 copies of its first edition was not sold until June 1861.
Spencer's interest in psychology derived from a more fundamental concern which was to establish the universality of natural law. In common with others of his generation, including the members of Chapman's salon, he was possessed with the idea of demonstrating that it was possible to show that everything in the universe - including human culture, language, and morality - could be explained by laws of universal validity. This was in contrast to the views of many theologians of the time who insisted that some parts of creation, in particular the human soul, were beyond the realm of scientific investigation. Comte's Systeme de Philosophie Positive had been written with the ambition of demonstrating the universality of natural law, and Spencer was to follow Comte in the scale of his ambition. However, Spencer differed from Comte in believing it was possible to discover a single law of universal application which he identified with progressive development and was to call the principle of evolution.

Spencer at age 38
In 1858 Spencer produced an outline of what was to become the System of Synthetic Philosophy. This immense undertaking, which has few parallels in the English language, aimed to demonstrate that the principle of evolution applied in biology, psychology, sociology (Spencer appropriated Comte's term for the new discipline) and morality. Spencer envisaged that this work of ten volumes would take twenty years to complete; in the event it took him twice as long and consumed almost all the rest of his long life.
Despite Spencer's early struggles to establish himself as a writer, by the 1870s he had become the most famous philosopher of the age. His works were widely read during his lifetime, and by 1869 he was able to support himself solely on the profit of book sales and on income from his regular contributions to Victorian periodicals which were collected as three volumes of Essays. His works were translated into German, Italian, Spanish, French, Russian, Japanese and Chinese, and into many other languages and he was offered honors and awards all over Europe and North America. He also became a member of the Athenaeum, an exclusive Gentleman's Club in London open only to those distinguished in the arts and sciences, and the X Club, a dining club of nine founded by T.H. Huxley that met every month and included some of the most prominent thinkers of the Victorian age (three of whom would become presidents of the Royal Society).
Members included physicist-philosopher John Tyndall and Darwin's cousin, the banker and biologist Sir John Lubbock. There were also some quite significant satellites such as liberal clergyman Arthur Stanley, the Dean of Westminster; and guests such as Charles Darwin and Hermann von Helmholtz were entertained from time to time. Through such associations, Spencer had a strong presence in the heart of the scientific community and was able to secure an influential audience for his views. He never married, and despite his growing wealth and fame never owned a house of his own.
The last decades of Spencer's life were characterized by growing disillusionment and loneliness. He never married, and after 1855 was a perpetual hypochondriac who complained endlessly of pains and maladies that no physician could diagnose. By the 1890s his readership had begun to desert him while many of his closest friends died and he had come to doubt the confident faith in progress that he had made the center-piece of his philosophical system. His later years were also ones in which his political views became increasingly conservative. Whereas Social Statics had been the work of a radical democrat who believed in votes for women (and even for children) and in the nationalization of the land to break the power of the aristocracy, by the 1880s he had become a staunch opponent of female suffrage and made common cause with the landowners of the Liberty and Property Defence League against what they saw as the 'socialism' of the administration of William Ewart Gladstone. Spencer's political views from this period were expressed in what has become his most famous work, The Man versus the State.

Grave of Herbert Spencer in Highgate Cemetery. It is a coincidence that his grave is near that of Karl Marx.
The exception to Spencer's growing conservativism was that he remained throughout his life an ardent opponent of imperialism and militarism. His critique of the Boer War was especially scathing, and it contributed to his declining popularity in Britain.
In 1902, shortly before his death, Spencer was nominated for the Nobel Prize for literature. He continued writing all his life, in later years often by dictation, until he succumbed to poor health at the age of 83. His ashes are interred in the eastern side of London's Highgate Cemetery facing Karl Marx's grave. At Spencer's funeral the Indian nationalist leader Shyamji Krishnavarma announced a donation of £1,000 to establish a lectureship at Oxford University in tribute to Spencer and his work


The System of Synthetic Philosophy
The basis for Spencer's appeal to many of his generation was that he appeared to offer a ready-made system of belief which could substitute for conventional religious faith at a time when orthodox creeds were crumbling under the advances of modern science. Spencer's philosophical system seemed to demonstrate that it was possible to believe in the ultimate perfection of humanity on the basis of advanced scientific conceptions such as the first law of thermodynamics and biological evolution.
In essence Spencer’s philosophical vision was formed by a combination of Deism and Positivism. On the one hand, he had imbibed something of eighteenth century Deism from his father and other members of the Derby Philosophical Society and from books like George Combe’s immensely popular The Constitution of Man (1828). This treated the world as a cosmos of benevolent design, and the laws of nature as the decrees of a 'Being transcendentally kind.' Natural laws were thus the statutes of a well governed universe that had been decreed by the Creator with the intention of promoting human happiness. Although Spencer lost his Christian faith as a teenager and later rejected any 'anthropomorphic' conception of the Deity, he nonetheless held fast to this conception at an almost sub-conscious level. At the same time, however, he owed far more than he would ever acknowledge to Positivism, in particular in its conception of a philosophical system as the unification of the various branches of scientific knowledge. He also followed Positivism in his insistence that it was only possible to have genuine knowledge of phenomena and hence that it was idle to speculate about the nature of the ultimate reality. The tension between Positivism and his residual Deism ran through the entire System of Synthetic Philosophy.
Spencer followed Comte in aiming for the unification of scientific truth; it was in this sense that his philosophy aimed to be 'synthetic.' Like Comte, he was committed to the universality of natural law, the idea that the laws of nature applied without exception, to the organic realm as much as to the inorganic, and to the human mind as much as to the rest of creation. The first objective of the Synthetic Philosophy was thus to demonstrate that there were no exceptions to being able to discover scientific explanations, in the form of natural laws, of all the phenomena of the universe. Spencer’s volumes on biology, psychology, and sociology were all intended to demonstrate the existence of natural laws in these specific disciplines. Even in his writings on ethics, he held that it was possible to discover ‘laws’ of morality that had the status of laws of nature while still having normative content, a conception which can be traced to Combe’s Constitution of Man.
The second objective of the Synthetic Philosophy was to show that these same laws led inexorably to Progress. In contrast to Comte, who stressed only the unity of scientific method, Spencer sought the unification of scientific knowledge in the form of the reduction of all natural laws to one fundamental law, the law of evolution. In this respect, he followed the model laid down by the Edinburgh publisher Robert Chambers in his anonymous Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844). Although often dismissed as a lightweight forerunner of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, Chambers’ book was in reality a programme for the unification of science which aimed to show that Laplace’s Nebular Hypothesis for the origin of the solar system and Lamarck’s theory of species transformation were both instances (in Lewes' phrase) of 'one magnificent generalization of progressive development.' Chambers was associated with Chapman’s salon and his work served as the unacknowledged template for the Synthetic Philosophy.

Concept of evolution
The first clear articulation of Spencer’s evolutionary perspective occurred in his essay 'Progress: Its Law and Cause' published in Chapman's Westminster Review in 1857, and which later formed the basis of the First Principles of a New System of Philosophy (1862). In it he expounded a theory of evolution which combined insights from Samuel Taylor Coleridge's essay 'The Theory of Life' – itself derivative from Friedrich von Schelling's Naturphilosophie – with a generalization of von Baer’s law of embryological development. Spencer posited that all structures in the universe develop from a simple, undifferentiated, homogeneity to a complex, differentiated, heterogeneity, while being accompanied by a process of greater integration of the differentiated parts. This evolutionary process could be found at work, Spencer believed, throughout the cosmos. It was a universal law, applying to the stars and the galaxies as much as to biological organisms, and to human social organization as much as to the human mind. It differed from other scientific laws only by its greater generality, and the laws of the special sciences could be shown to be illustrations of this principle.
This attempt to explain the evolution of complexity was radically different to that to be found in Darwin’s Origin of Species which was published two years later. Spencer is often, quite erroneously, believed to have merely appropriated and generalized Darwin’s work on natural selection. But although after reading Darwin's work he coined the phrase 'survival of the fittest' as his own term for Darwin's concept,[1] and is often misrepresented as a thinker who merely applied the Darwinian theory to society, he only grudgingly incorporated natural selection into his preexisting overall system. The primary mechanism of species transformation that he recognized was Lamarckian use-inheritance which posited that organs are developed or are diminished by use or disuse and that the resulting changes may be transmitted to future generations. Spencer believed that this evolutionary mechanism was also necessary to explain 'higher' evolution, especially the social development of humanity. Moreover, in contrast to Darwin, he held that evolution had a direction and an end-point, the attainment of a final state of 'equilibrium.'

Sociology
The evolutionary progression from simple, undifferentiated homogeneity to complex, differentiated, heterogeneity was exemplified, Spencer argued, by the development of society. He developed a theory of two types of society, the militant and the industrial, which corresponded to this evolutionary progression. Militant society, structured around relationships of hierarchy and obedience, was simple and undifferentiated; industrial society, based on voluntary, contractually assumed social obligations, was complex and differentiated. Society, which Spencer conceptualized as a 'social organism' evolved from the simpler state to the more complex according to the universal law of evolution. Moreover, industrial society was the direct descendant of the ideal society developed in Social Statics, although Spencer now equivocated over whether the evolution of society would result in anarchism (as he had first believed) or whether it pointed to a continued role for the state, albeit one reduced to the minimal functions of the enforcement of contracts and external defence.

Ethics


The end point of the evolutionary process would be the creation of 'the perfect man in the perfect society' with human beings becoming completely adapted to social life, as predicted in Spencer’s first book. The chief difference between Spencer’s earlier and later conceptions of this process was the evolutionary timescale involved. The psychological – and hence also the moral – constitution which had been bequeathed to the present generation by our ancestors, and which we in turn would hand on to future generations, was in the process of gradual adaptation to the requirements of living in society. For example, aggression was a survival instinct which had been necessary in the primitive conditions of life, but was maladaptive in advanced societies. Because human instincts had a specific location in strands of brain tissue, they were subject to the Lamarckian mechanism of use-inheritance so that gradual modifications could be transmitted to future generations. Over the course of many generations the evolutionary process would ensure that human beings would become less aggressive and increasingly altruistic, leading eventually to a perfect society in which no one would cause another person pain.
However, for evolution to produce the perfect individual it was necessary for present and future generations to experience the 'natural' consequences of their conduct. Only in this way would individuals have the incentives required to work on self-improvement and thus to hand an improved moral constitution to their descendants. Hence anything that interfered with the 'natural' relationship of conduct and consequence was to be resisted and this included the use of the coercive power of the state to relieve poverty, to provide public education, or to require compulsory vaccination. Although charitable giving was to be encouraged even it had to be limited by the consideration that suffering was frequently the result of individuals receiving the consequences of their actions. Hence too much individual benevolence directed to the 'undeserving poor' would break the link between conduct and consequence that Spencer considered fundamental to ensuring that humanity continued to evolve to a higher level of development.
Spencer adopted a utilitarian standard of ultimate value – the greatest happiness of the greatest number – and the culmination of the evolutionary process would be the maximization of utility. In the perfect society individuals would not only derive pleasure from the exercise of altruism ('positive beneficence') but would aim to avoid inflicting pain on others ('negative beneficence'). They would also instinctively respect the rights of others, leading to the universal observance of the principle of justice – each person had the right to a maximum amount of liberty that was compatible with a like liberty in others. 'Liberty' was interpreted to mean the absence of coercion, and was closely connected to the right to private property. Spencer termed this code of conduct 'Absolute Ethics' which provided a scientifically-grounded moral system that could substitute for the supernaturally-based ethical systems of the past. However, he recognized that our inherited moral constitution does not currently permit us to behave in full compliance with the code of Absolute Ethics, and for this reason we need a code of 'Relative Ethics' which takes into account the distorting factors of our present imperfections.

Agnosticism
Spencer's reputation among the Victorians owed a great deal to his agnosticism, the claim that it is impossible for us to have certain knowledge of God. He rejected theology as representing the 'impiety of the pious.' He was to gain much notoriety from his repudiation of traditional religion, and was frequently condemned by religious thinkers for allegedly advocating atheism and materialism. Nonetheless, unlike Huxley, whose agnosticism was a militant creed directed at ‘the unpardonable sin of faith’ (in Adrian Desmond’s phrase), Spencer insisted that he was not concerned to undermine religion in the name of science, but to bring about a reconciliation of the two.
Starting either from religious belief or from science, Spencer argued, we are ultimately driven to accept certain indispensable but literally inconceivable notions. Whether we are concerned with a Creator or the substratum which underlies our experience of phenomena, we can frame no conception of it. Therefore, Spencer concluded, religion and science agree in the supreme truth that the human understanding is only capable of 'relative' knowledge. This is the case since, owing to the inherent limitations of the human mind, it is only possible to obtain knowledge of phenomena, not of the reality ('the absolute') underlying phenomena. Hence both science and religion must come to recognize as the 'most certain of all facts that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.' He called this awareness of 'the Unknowable' and he presented worship of the Unknowable as capable of being a positive faith which could substitute for conventional religion. Indeed, he thought that the Unknowable represented the ultimate stage in the evolution of religion, the final elimination of its last anthropomorphic vestiges.

Political views
Spencerian views in 21st century circulation derive from his political theories and memorable attacks on the reform movements of the late 19th century. He has been claimed as a precursor by Libertarians and philosophical anarchists.
Politics in late Victorian Britain moved in directions that Spencer disliked, and his arguments provided so much ammunition for conservatives and individualists in Europe and America that they still are in use in the 21st century.
By the 1880s he was denouncing "the new Toryism" (that is, the social reformist wing of Prime Minister William E. Gladstone). In The Man versus the State (1884), he attacked Gladstone and the Liberal party for losing its proper mission (they should be defending personal liberty, he said) and instead promoting paternalist social legislation. Spencer denounced Irish land reform, compulsory education, laws to regulate safety at work, prohibition and temperance laws, free libraries, and welfare reforms. His main objections were threefold: the use of the coercive powers of the government, the discouragement given to voluntary self-improvement, and the disregard of the "laws of life." The reforms, he said, were tantamount to "socialism", which he said was about the same as "slavery" in terms of limiting human freedom. Spencer vehemently attacked the widespread enthusiasm for annexation of colonies and imperial expansion, which subverted all he had predicted about evolutionary progress from ‘militant’ to ‘industrial’ societies and states.
Spencer anticipated many of the analytical standpoints of later libertarian theorists such as Friedrich Hayek, especially in his "law of equal liberty", his insistence on the limits to predictive knowledge, his model of a spontaneous social order, and his warnings about the "unintended consequences" of collectivist social reforms.

Social Darwinism
Spencer created the Social Darwinist model that applied the law of the survival of the fittest to society. Humanitarian impulses had to be resisted as nothing should be allowed to interfere with nature's laws, including the social struggle for existence. This interpretation has its primary source in Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought, which is frequently cited in the secondary literature as an authoritative account of the Synthetic Philosophy. Through constant repetition Hofstadter's Spencer has taken on a life of its own, his views and arguments represented by the same few passages, usually cited not directly from the source but from Hofstadter's rather selective quotations.
However, to regard Spencer as any kind of Darwinian, even of the 'Social' variety, is a gross distortion. He could never bring himself to abandon the idea that evolution equated to progress, that it involved the unfolding of a pre-existent pattern, and that there would be a final resting point – 'equilibrium' – in which an ultimate state of perfection was attained. Darwinian natural selection, with its open-ended process of change based on random variations that prospered or failed depending on their adaptation to environmental conditions, was thus far removed from Spencer’s vision of progressive development, and he struggled hard to find a place for it within his overall system. Against this background, his use of the theory of natural selection could never be more than window dressing as it threatened the idea of universal evolutionary progress and thus the scientific foundation for morality that he hoped to establish. In contrast to the harsh and unforgiving imperative that the weak must be made to go to the wall, his main political message was essentially an anti-political one about the efficacy of self-improvement rather than collective action in bringing about the promised future state of human perfection.

General influence
While most philosophers fail to achieve much of a following outside the academy or their professional peers, by the 1870s and 1880s Spencer had achieved an unparalleled popularity, as the sheer volume of his sales indicate. He was probably the first, and possibly the only, philosopher in history to sell over a million copies of his works during his own lifetime. In the United States, where pirated editions were still commonplace, his authorized publisher, Appleton, sold 368,755 copies between 1860 and 1903. This figure did not differ much from his sales in his native Britain, and once editions in the rest of the world are added in the figure of a million copies seems like a conservative estimate. As William James remarked, Spencer "enlarged the imagination, and set free the speculative mind of countless doctors, engineers, and lawyers, of many physicists and chemists, and of thoughtful laymen generally." The aspect of his thought that emphasized individual self-improvement found a ready audience in the skilled working class.
Spencer's influence among the leaders of thought was also immense, although it was most often expressed in terms of their reaction to, and repudiation of, his ideas. As his American follower John Fiske observed, Spencer's ideas were to be found "running like the weft through all the warp" of Victorian thought.Such varied thinkers as Henry Sidgwick, T.H. Green, G.E. Moore, William James, Henri Bergson, and Emile Durkheim defined their ideas in relation to his. Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society is to a very large extent an extended debate with Spencer from whose sociology, many commentators now agree, Durkheim borrowed extensively. In post-1863-Uprising Poland, many of Spencer's ideas became integral to the dominant ideology, "Polish Positivism." The leading Polish writer of the period, Bolesław Prus, adopted Spencer's metaphor of society-as-organism, giving it a striking poetic presentation in his 1884 story, "Mold of the Earth," and highlighting the concept in the introduction to his most universal novel, Pharaoh (1895).
The early 20th century was hostile to Spencer. Soon after his death his philosophical reputation went into a sharp decline. Half a century after his death his work was dismissed as a "parody of philosophy",and the historian Richard Hofstadter called him "the metaphysician of the homemade intellectual, and the prophet of the cracker-barrel agnostic."[13] Nonetheless, Spencer’s thought had penetrated so deeply into the Victorian age that his influence did not disappear entirely. In the late 20th century, however, much more positive estimates have appeared


Political influence
Despite his reputation as a Social Darwinist, Spencer's political thought has been open to multiple interpretations. His political philosophy could both provide inspiration to those who believed that individuals were masters of their fate, who should brook no interference from a meddling state, and those who believed that social development required a strong central authority. In Lochner v. New York, conservative justices of the United States Supreme Court could find inspiration in Spencer's writings for striking down a New York law limiting the number of hours a baker could work during the week, on the ground that this law restricted liberty of contract. Arguing against the majority's holding that a "right to free contract" is implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." On the other hand, Spencer has also been described as a quasi-anarchist, as well as an outright anarchist. Georgi Plekhanov, in his 1909 Anarchism and Socialism, labeled Spencer a "conservative Anarchist."
Spencer's ideas became very influential in China and Japan largely because he appealed to the reformers' desire to establish a strong nation-state with which to compete with the Western powers. He was translated by the Chinese scholar Yen Fu, who saw his writings as a prescription for the reform of the Qing state. Spencer also influenced the Japanese Westernizer Tokutomi Soho, who believed that Japan was on the verge of transitioning from a "militant society" to an "industrial society," and needed to quickly jettison all things Japanese and take up Western ethics and learning. He also corresponded with Kaneko Kentaro, warning him of the dangers of imperialism


Influence on literature
Spencer also exerted a great influence on literature and rhetoric. His 1852 essay, “The Philosophy of Style,” explored a growing trend of formalist approaches to writing. Highly focused on the proper placement and ordering of the parts of an English sentence, he created a guide for effective composition. Spencer’s aim was to free prose writing from as much "friction and inertia" as possible, so that the reader would not be slowed by strenuous deliberations concerning the proper context and meaning of a sentence. Spencer argued that it is the writer's ideal "To so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort" by the reader.
He argued that by making the meaning as readily accessible as possible, the writer would achieve the greatest possible communicative efficiency. This was accomplished, according to Spencer, by placing all the subordinate clauses, objects and phrases before the subject of a sentence so that, when readers reached the subject, they had all the information they needed to completely perceive its significance. While the overall influence that “The Philosophy of Style” had on the field of rhetoric was not as far-reaching as his contribution to other fields, Spencer’s voice lent authoritative support to formalist views of rhetoric.
Spencer also had an influence on literature, as many novelists came to address his ideas in their work. George Eliot, Leo Tolstoy, Thomas Hardy, Bolesław Prus, Abraham Cahan and D. H. Lawrence all referenced Spencer. Arnold Bennett greatly praised First Principles, and the influence it had on Bennett may be seen in his many novels. Jack London went so far as to create a character, Martin Eden, a staunch Spencerian. H.G. Wells used Spencer's ideas as a theme in his novella, The Time Machine, employing them to explain the evolution of man into two species. It is perhaps the best testimony to the influence of Spencer’s beliefs and writings that his reach was so diverse. He influenced not only the administrators who shaped their societies’ inner workings, but also the artists who helped shape those societies' ideals and beliefs.

Primary sources
Papers of Herbert Spencer in Senate House Library, University of London
Most of Spencer's books are available online
"On The Proper Sphere of Government" (1842)
Social Statics: or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed (1851)
"The Right to Ignore the State", Chapter XIX of the first edition of Social Statics
Social Statics: Abridged and Revised (1892)
"A Theory of Population" (1852)
Principles of Psychology (1855), first edition, issued in one volume
Education (1861)
System of Synthetic Philosophy',' in ten volumes
First Principles ISBN 0-89875-795-9 (1862)
Principles of Biology (1864, 1867; revised and enlarged: 1898), in two volumes
Volume I — Part I: The Data of Biology; Part II: The Inductions of Biology; Part III: The Evolution of Life; Appendices
Volume II — Part IV: Morphological Development; Part V: Physiological Development; Part VI: Laws of Mutiplication; Appendices
Principles of Psychology (1870, 1880), in two volumes
Volume I — Part I: The Data of Pscyhology; Part II: The Inductions of Pscyhology; Part III: General Synthesis; Part IV: Special Synthesis; Part V: Physical Synthesis; Appendix
Volume II — Part VI: Special Analysis; Part VII: General Analysis; Part VIII: Congruities; Part IX: Corollaries
Principles of Sociology, in three volumes
Volume I (1874-75; enlarged 1876, 1885) — Part I: Data of Sociology; Part II: Inductions of Sociology; Part III: Domestic Institutions
Volume II — Part IV: Ceremonial Institutions (1879); Part V: Political Institutions (1882); Part VI [published here in some editions]: Ecclesiastical Institutions (1885)
Vollume III — Part VI [published here in some editions]: Ecclesiastical Institutions (1885); Part VII: Professional Institutions (1896); Part VIII: Industrial Institutions (1896); References
The Principles of Ethics (1897), in two volumes
Volume I — Part I: The Data of Ethics (1879); Part II: The Inductions of Ethics (1892); Part III: The Ethics of Individual Life (1892); References
Volume II — Part IV: The Ethics of Social Life: Justice (1891); Part V: The Ethics of Social Life: Negative Beneficence (1892); Part VI: The Ethics of Social Life: Positive Beneficence (1892); Appendices
The Study of Sociology (1873, 1896)
An Autobiography (1904), in two volumes
See also Spencer, Herbert (1904). An Autobiography. D. Appleton and Company.
v1 Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer by David Duncan (1908)
v2 Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer by David Duncan (1908)
Descriptive Sociology; or Groups of Sociological Facts, parts 1-8, classified and arranged by Spencer, compiled and abstracted by David Duncan, Richard Schepping, and James Collier (London, Williams & Norgate, 1873-1881).
Essay Collections:
Ilustrations of Universal Progress: A Series of Discussions (1864, 1883)
The Man Versus the State (1884)
Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative (1891), in three volumes:
Volume I (includes "The Development Hypothesis," "Progress: Its Law and Cause," "The Factors of Organic Evolution" and others)
Volume II (includes "The Classification of the Sciences," The Philosophy of Style (1852), The Origin and Function of Music," "The Physiology of Laughter," and others)
Volume III (includes "The Ethics of Kant," "State Tamperings With Money and Banks," "Specialized Administration," "From Freedom to Bondage," "The Americans," and others)
Various Fragments (1897, enlarged 1900)
Facts and Comments (1902)

Philosophers' critiques
Herbert Spencer: An Estimate and Review by Josiah Royce (1904)
Lectures on the Ethics of T.H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau by Henry Sidgwick (1902)
A Few Words with Mr Herbert Spencer by Paul Lafargue (1884)

See also
Auberon Herbert
Classical liberalism
Cultural evolution
Liberalism
Contributions to liberal theory
Libertarianism
Mold of the Earth (a story by Bolesław Prus, inspired by a concept of Spencer's)
Scientism and positivism
Etherscope

Notes
^ a b "Pioneers of Psychology [2001 Tour - School of Education & Psychology]". Retrieved on 2007-08-29. Maurice E. Stucke. "Better Competition Advocacy" (pdf). Retrieved on 2007-08-29. "Herbert Spencer in his Principles of Biology of 1864, vol. 1, p. 444, wrote “This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called ‘natural selection’, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.”"
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer pp. 53-55
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer p. 113
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer p. 75
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer By David Duncan p. 537
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer p. 497
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer p. 464
^ Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer, p. 537
^ James, William. "Herbert Spencer". The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XCIV (1904), p. 104.
^ Quoted in Offer, John (2000), Herbert Spencer: Critical Assessments, p. 613. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0415181852.
^ Robert G. Perrin, "Émile Durkheim's Division of Labor and the Shadow of Herbert Spencer," Sociological Quarterly 36#4 pp 791-808
^ Himmelfarb, Gertrude (1968). Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution, p. 222. Quoted in Richards, Robert J. (1989), Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior, p. 243. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226712001.
^ Hofstadter, Richard (1992). Social Darwinism in American Thought, p. 32. Beacon Press. ISBN 0807055034.
^ See Francis (2007)
^ Plekhanov, Georgiĭ Valentinovich (1912), trans. Aveling, Eleanor Marx. Anarchism and Socialism, p. 143. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.
^ Schwartz, Benjamin In Search of Wealth and Power (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1964).
^ Pyle, Kenneth The New Generation in Meiji Japan (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1969)
^ Spencer to Kaneko Kentaro, 26 August 1892 in the Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer ed. David Duncan, 1908 p 296.

References
Carneiro, Robert L. and Perrin, Robert G. "Herbert Spencer's 'Principles of Sociology:' a Centennial Retrospective and Appraisal." Annals of Science 2002 59(3): 221-261 online at Ebsco
Duncan, David. The life and letters of Herbert Spencer (1908) online edition
Elliot, Hugh. Herbert Spencer. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917
Elwick, James. "Herbert Spencer and the Disunity of the Social Organism." History of Science 41, 2003, pp. 35-72.
Elliott, Paul 'Erasmus Darwin, Herbert Spencer and the origins of the evolutionary worldview in British provincial scientific culture', Isis 94 (2003), 1-29
Francis, Mark, Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life. Newcastle UK: Acumen Publishing, 2007 ISBN 0801445906
Harris, Jose. "Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903)", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,(2004) online, a standard short biography
Hofstadter, Richard, Social Darwinism in American Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
Kennedy, James G. Herbert Spencer. Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1978
Lightman, Bernard, The Origins of Agnosticism: Victorian unbelief and the limits of knowledge. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
Mandelbaum, Maurice, History, Man, and Reason : a study in nineteenth-century thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971.
Rafferty, Edward C.; “The Right to the Use of the Earth.,” Herbert Spencer, the Washington Intellectual Community, and American Conservation in the Late Nineteenth Century.
Richards, Robert J. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Taylor, Michael W., Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Taylor, Michael W., The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. London: Continuum, (2007)
Three Initiates (1912). The Kybalion. Chicago: The Yogi Publication Society/Masonic Temple.
Turner, Jonathan H., Herbert Spencer: A Renewed Appreciation. Sage Publications, Inc., 1985. ISBN 0803924267
Versen, Christopher R., Optimistic Liberals: Herbert Spencer, the Brooklyn Ethical Association, and the Integration of Moral Philosophy and Evolution in the Victorian Trans-Atlantic Community. Florida State University, 2006.

By Spencer
Spencer, Herbert. Spencer: Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) edited by John Offer (1993) excerpt and text search
Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics: The Man Versus the State
Spencer, Herbert. The study of sociology excerpt and text search; also full text online free
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Psychology excerpt and text search; full text online
Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics, Abridged and Revised: Together with the Man Versus the State (1896), highly influential among libertarians full text online free
Spencer, Herbert. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (1891) 283pp full text online
Spencer, Herbert. An Autobiography (1905, 2 vol) full text online
online writings of Spencer


Herbert Marcuse

Birth
July 19, 1898 (Berlin, Germany)
Death
July 29, 1979 (aged 81) (Starnberg, Germany)
School/tradition
Frankfurt School, critical theory
Main interests
social theory, Marxism
Influenced by


Norman O. Brown, Angela Davis, Andrew Feenberg, Jürgen Habermas, Abbie Hoffman, Gad Horowitz, Douglas Kellner, William Leiss
Herbert Marcuse (July 19, 1898July 29, 1979) was a German philosopher and sociologist, and a member of the Frankfurt School. His best known works are Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man.

Life and work
Herbert Marcuse was born in Berlin to Carl Marcuse and Gertrud Kreslawsky and raised in a Jewish family and served in the German Army, caring for horses in Berlin during the First World War. He then became a member of a Soldiers' Council that participated in the aborted socialist Spartacist uprising. After completing his Ph.D. thesis at the University of Freiburg in 1922 on the German Künstlerroman, he moved back to Berlin, where he worked in publishing. He returned to Freiburg in 1929 to write a Habilitation with Martin Heidegger, which was published in 1932 as Hegel's Ontology and Theory of Historicity in spite of Heidegger's rejection. With his academic career blocked by the rise of the Third Reich, in 1933 Marcuse joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, emigrating from Germany that same year, going first to Switzerland, then the United States, where he became a naturalized citizen in 1940.
Although he never returned to Germany to live, he remained one of the major theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, along with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (among others). In 1940 he published Reason and Revolution, a dialectical work studying Georg W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx.
During World War II Marcuse first worked for the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) on anti-Nazi propaganda projects. In 1943 he transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency. His work for the OSS involved research on Nazi Germany and denazification. After the dissolution of the OSS in 1945, Marcuse was employed by the US Department of State as head of the Central European section, retiring after the death of his first wife in 1951.
In 1952 he began a teaching career as a political theorist, first at Columbia University and Harvard University, then at Brandeis University from 1958 to 1965, where he taught philosophy and politics, and finally (by then he was past the usual retirement age), at the University of California, San Diego. He was a friend and collaborator of the political sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr. and of the political philosopher Robert Paul Wolff, and also a friend of the Columbia University sociology professor C. Wright Mills, one of the founders of the New Left movement.
In the post-war period, Marcuse was the most explicitly political and left-wing member of the Frankfurt School, continuing to identify himself as a Marxist, a socialist, and a Hegelian.
Marcuse's critiques of capitalist society (especially his 1955 synthesis of Marx and Freud, Eros and Civilization, and his 1964 book One-Dimensional Man) resonated with the concerns of the student movement in the 1960s. Because of his willingness to speak at student protests, Marcuse soon became known as "the father of the New Left in the United States," a term he strongly disliked and disavowed. His work heavily influenced intellectual discourse on popular culture and scholarly popular culture studies. He had many speaking engagements in the US and Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s. He became a close friend and inspirer of the French philosopher André Gorz.
Marcuse defended the arrested East German dissident Rudolf Bahro (author of Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus [trans., The Alternative in Eastern Europe]), discussing in a 1979 essay Bahro's theories of "change from within" .
Many radical scholars and activists were influenced by Marcuse, such as Angela Davis, Abbie Hoffman, Rudi Dutschke, and Robert M. Young. (See the List of Scholars and Activists link, below.) Among those who critiqued him from the left were Marxist-humanist Raya Dunayevskaya, and fellow German emigre Paul Mattick, both of whom subjected One-Dimensional Man to a Marxist critique. Marcuse's 1965 essay "Repressive Tolerance", in which he claimed capitalist democracies can have totalitarian aspects, has been criticized by conservatives. Marcuse argues that genuine tolerance does not tolerate support for repression, since doing so ensures that marginalized voices will remain unheard. He characterizes tolerance of repressive speech as "inauthentic." Instead, he advocates a discriminatory form of tolerance that does not allow so-called "repressive" intolerance to be voiced.
Marcuse married three times. His first wife was mathematician Sophie Wertman (1901–1951), with whom he had a son, Peter (born 1928). Herbert's second marriage was to Inge Neumann (1913?–1972), the widow of his close friend Franz Neumann (1900-1954). His third wife was Erica Sherover (1938–1988), a former graduate student and forty years his junior, whom he married in 1976. His son Peter is currently professor emeritus of Urban Planning at Columbia University.
Ten days after his eighty-first birthday, Marcuse died on July 29, 1979, after having suffered a stroke during a visit to Germany. He had spoken at the Frankfurt Römerberggespräche, and second-generation Frankfurt School theorist Jürgen Habermas had invited him to the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of the Scientific-Technical World in Starnberg.

Primary literature
The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State (1934)
Reason and Revolution (1941)
Eros and Civilization (1955)
Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (1958)
One-Dimensional Man (1964)
Repressive Tolerance (1965)
Negations (1968)
An Essay on Liberation (1969)
Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972)
The Aesthetic Dimension (1978)


Howard S. Becker

For other people named Howard Becker, see Howard Becker.
Howard Saul Becker (born April 18, 1928, Chicago) is an American sociologist.

Biography
Howard Becker was born in 1928 in Chicago. As an undergraduate and later a graduate student at the University of Chicago, he worked as a professional jazz pianist. His professor, Everett C. Hughes, whose primary interest was the sociology of work and professions, was an important influence on Becker. It was Hughes, Becker reports, who first encouraged him to undertake the study of jazz musicians as a professional group. This research led Becker to write extensively about drug use, and he put off publishing it for over a decade until 1963, when the political climate in the United States had improved. The resulting book, "Outsiders" was a critical work in the sociology of deviance and laid the foundation of labeling theory.
For his doctoral dissertation, Becker studied Chicago schoolteachers. Generally speaking, his work reflects the prevailing thematic and theoretical preoccupations of Chicago sociology at that time, with its attention to symbolic interactions involving race, status, and power in the urban meltingpot. Erving Goffman was a contemporary of Becker's at Chicago, and their research interests and writing styles both reflect a similar formative milieu.
Becker received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago in 1951, and went on to teach in Sociology Departments at Northwestern University, the University of Washington, and the University of California at Santa Barbara. However, the majority of his research, writing and teaching was in other fields of sociology, including but not limited to the sociology of art, qualitative method, visual sociology and the practice of research and writing (composition theory) in social sciences.
He is known for the clarity of his prose, and is a staunch advocate of what has been termed the "Plain style" of writing (see, for example, The Elements of Style). His stylistic predilections betray his academic pedigree: at the time he was a student, sociologists at the University of Chicago embraced European positivism and Midwestern pragmatism. They sought to communicate their ideas with scientific precision, on the one hand, while making them accessible to politicians and planners, on the other. Becker's book Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article is considered to be one of the best books advising all academics how to write, and reflects the conviction that clear prose and clear thinking are inseparable. He served on the advisory board for the 15th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style.
Becker is notable for coing the phrase "hierarchy of credibility (in ‘Whose Side Are We On?’, Social Problems, 1967.)" The Hierarchy of credibility is a concept according purportedly objective judjements of fact and evidence are necessarily tilted in favor of those at the top of a society because they will have had more resources to produce seemingly objective evidence that tends to favor the privileges they enjoy. Becker argues that it is the scholar's responsibility to create evidence that supports the claims of society's least privileged.
Becker regularly sojourns in France in the company of Alain Pessin, a sociologist at the University of Grenoble who has written a book on Becker titled Un sociologue en liberté. Lecture de Howard S. Becker (A sociologist in liberty; a reading of Howard S. Becker).


Raghavendra Gadagkar
Prof. Raghavendra Gadagkar
Born
June 28, 1953 (1953-06-28) (age 55)Kanpur, India
Residence
Bangalore, India
Nationality
India
Fields
Biologist
Institutions
Indian Institute of Science
Known for
sociobiology, eusociality
Notable awards
Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar Award in Biological Sciences (1993)
Raghavendra Gadagkar is a professor at the Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, India. who studies evolution using eusocial insects Ropalidia marginata.
Gadagkar has published over 200 research papers and articles.
His first book, Survival Strategies, widely appreciated and has been translated into Chinese and Korean. It uses simple language to explain recent advances in behavioural ecology and sociobiology to a general audience.
He has also written a more technical book, The Social Biology of Ropalidia, which puts together over twenty years of his research about the evolution of eusociality.
Since 2002 he is Non-resident Permanent Fellow at prestigious German institute Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.

Wednesday, November 12, 2008



M. N. Srinivas

Mysore Narasimhachar Srinivas (1916–1999) was a world-renowned Indian sociologist. He is mostly known for his work on caste and caste systems, social stratification and Sanskritisation in southern India.

Career
He earned his doctorate in sociology from the University of Bombay and went on to the University of Oxford for further studies. Although he had already written a book on family and marriage in Mysore and completed his Ph.D. at University of Bombay before he went to the University of Oxford in the late forties for further studies, his training there was to play a significant role in the development of his ideas.

His contribution to Indian sociology and social anthropology
Srinivas’ contribution to the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology and to public life in India was unique. It was his capacity to break out of the strong mould in which (the mostly North American university oriented) area studies had been shaped after the end of the Second World War on the one hand, and to experiment with the disciplinary grounding of social anthropology and sociology on the other, which marked his originality as a social scientist.
It may be important to point out that it was the conjuncture between Sanskritic scholarship and the strategic concerns of the Western bloc in the aftermath of the Second World War which had largely shaped South Asian area studies in the United States. During the colonial era, the Brahmins or Pandits were acknowledged as important interlocutors of Hindu laws and customs to the British colonial administration. The colonial assumptions about an unchanging Indian society led to the curious assemblage of Sanskrit studies with contemporary issues in most South Asian departments in the U.S. and elsewhere. It was strongly believed that an Indian sociology must lie at the conjunction of Indology and sociology.
Srinivas' scholarship was to challenge that dominant paradigm for understanding Indian society and would in the process, usher newer intellectual frameworks for understanding Hindu society. His views on the importance of caste in the electoral processes in India are well known. While some have interpreted this to attest to the enduring structural principles of social stratification of Indian society, for Srinivas these symbolized the dynamic changes that were taking place as democracy spread and electoral politics became a resource in the local world of village society.
By inclination he was not given to utopian constructions – his ideas about justice, equality and eradication of poverty were rooted in his experiences on the ground. His integrity in the face of demands that his sociology should take into account the new and radical aspirations was one of the most moving aspects of his writing. Through use of terms such as "sanskritisation", "dominant caste", "vertical (inter-caste) and horizontal (intra-caste) solidarities", Srinivas sought to capture the fluid and dynamic essence of caste as a social institution.

His methodology
As part of his methodological practice, Srinivas strongly advocated ethnographic research based on fieldwork, but his concept of fieldwork was tied to the notion of locally bounded sites. Thus some of his best papers, such as the paper on dominant caste and one on a joint family dispute, were largely inspired from his direct participation (and as a participant observer) in rural life in south India. He wrote several papers on the themes of national integration, issues of gender, new technologies, etc. It is really surprising as to why he did not theorize on the methodological implications of writing on these issues which go beyond the village and its institutions. His methodology and findings have been used and emulated by successive researchers who have studied caste in India.

Recognition
He received many honours from the University of Bombay, the Royal Anthropological Institute, and the Government of France; he has received the Padma Shri from the President of India; and he was the honorary foreign member of two prestigious academies: the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Books
Marriage and Family in Mysore (1942)
Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India (1952)
Caste in Modern India (1962), Asia Publishing House
The Remembered Village (1976)
Indian Society through Personal Writings (1998)
Village, Caste, Gender and Method (1998)
Social Change in Modern India
The Dominant Caste and Other Essays (ed.)
Dimensions of Social Change in India

Andre Béteille
Andre Béteille is one of India's leading sociologists and writers. He is particularly well known for his studies of the caste system in South India. He was a Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics at the University of Delhi where he is Professor Emeritus of Sociology since 2003.
He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in anthropology from the University of Calcutta. Thereafter he received his doctorate from the University of Delhi. After a brief stint at the Indian Statistical Institute as a research fellow, he joined the faculty of sociology at the DSE.
In his long and distinguished career, he has in the past taught at Oxford University, Cambridge University, the University of Chicago, and the London School of Economics. He is currently Chairman of the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta and of the Indian Council of Social Science Research.
In the words of historian Ramachandra Guha,

Béteille has written insightfully about all the major questions of the day: India's encounters with the West, the contest between religion and secularism, the relationship between caste and class, the links between poverty and inequality, the nurturing of public institutions, the role and responsibilities of the intellectual.

In 2005, Professor Béteille received the Padma Bhushan as a mark of recognition for his work in the field of Sociology. The same year he was appointed a member of the Prime Minister's National Knowledge Commission. In 2006, following a proposal for increasing caste-based reservations, Andre Beteille quit the Commission in protest. In 2006, he was made National Professor.
Béteille was born in Chandannagore - the youngest of three brothers and a sister. His father was mayor of the Chandannagore Municipality. He was educated in Calcutta - where the family shifted after independence. He graduated from St. Xavier's College, Calcutta and joined Delhi School of Economics for further studies.

Bibliography
Sociology: Essays on Approach and Method, Oxford University Press, 2002.
Antinomies of Society: Essays on Ideologies and Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2000.
Chronicles of Our Time, Penguin Books, 2000.
The Backward Classes in Contemporary India, Oxford University Press, 1992.
Society and Politics in India: Essays in a Comparative Perspective, Athlone Press, 1991 (L.S.E. Monographs in Social Anthropology, no. 63).
The Idea of Natural Inequality and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, 1983 (new, enlarged edition, Oxford University Press, 1987).
Inequality Among Men, Basil Blackwell, 1977 (Italian edition published as La diseguaglianza fra gli uomini, Il Mulino, 1981).
Studies in Agrarian Social Structure, Oxford University Press, 1974.
Six Essays in Comparative Sociology, Oxford University Press, 1974 (enlarged edition published as Essays in Comparative Sociology, Oxford University Press, 1987).
Inequality and Social Change, Oxford University Press, 1972.
Castes: Old and New, Essays in Social Structure and Social Stratification, Asia Publishing House, 1969.
Caste, Class and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village, University of California Press, 1965.

Essays
Secularism Re-examined
Race & Caste
Teaching & Research
Teaching and Research, Andre Beteille
Government & NGOs (scroll down)
The Indian Middle Class

Selected quotes
"The Indian intelligentsia has somewhat mixed attitudes towards the Indian village. While educated Indians are inclined to think or at least speak well of the village, they do not show much inclination for the company of villagers."
"In the past, Indian society was unique in the extremes of which it carried the principle and practice of inequality; today Indian intellectuals appear unique in their zeal for promoting the adoption of equality in every sphere of society."
"The vitality of a religion depends on a continuous critique of it by its own reflective members."
"A civilisation that cannot accommodate a variety of traditions, seeking to maintain a jealous hold on only one single tradition, can hardly be called a civilisation."
"The practice of untouchability is indeed reprehensible and must be condemned by one and all; but that does not mean that we should now begin to regard it as a form of racial discrimination. The Scheduled Castes of India taken together are no more a race than are the Brahmins taken together. Every social group cannot be regarded as a race simply because we want to protect it against prejudice and discrimination

"Treating caste as a form of race is politically mischievous; what is worse, it is scientifically nonsensical


Roy Bhaskar
Roy Bhaskar (born May 15, 1944) is a British philosopher, best known as a significant proponent of the philosophical movement of Critical Realism.
Early life
Bhaskar was born in London, the elder of two brothers. His Indian father and English mother were Theosophists[citation needed].
In 1963 Bhaskar began attending Balliol College, Oxford on a scholarship to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Having graduated with first class honours in 1966, he began work on a Ph.D. thesis about the relevance of economic theory for under-developed countries. This research led him to the philosophy of social science and then the philosophy of science. In the course of this Rom Harré became his supervisor.

Critical realism
Bhaskar's consideration of the philosophies of science and social science resulted in the development of Critical Realism, a philosophical approach that defends the critical and emancipatory potential of rational (scientific and philosophical) enquiry against both positivist, broadly defined, and 'postmodern' challenges. Its approach emphasises the importance of distinguishing between epistemological and ontological questions and the significance of objectivity properly understood for a critical project. Its conception of philosophy and social science is a socially situated, but not socially determined one, which maintains the possibility for objective critique to motivate social change, with the ultimate end being a promotion of human freedom.
The term Critical Realism was not initially used by Bhaskar. The philosophy began life as what Bhaskar called 'Transcendental Realism' in A Realist Theory of Science (1975), which he extended into the social sciences as 'Critical Naturalism' in The Possibility of Naturalism (1978). The term 'Critical Realism' is an elision of Transcendental Realism and Critical Naturalism, that has been subsequently accepted by Bhaskar after being proposed by others, partly because of its appropriate connotations; Critical Realism shares certain dimensions with German Critical Theory (see the Frankfurt School). Critical Realism should not be confused with various other 'critical realism's, including Georg Lukacs's aesthetic theory. In contemporary Critical Realist texts 'Critical Realism' is often abbreviated to 'CR'. A later dialectical development of Critical Realism in Bhaskar's work in Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (1993) led to a separate branch or second phase of CR known as 'Dialectical Critical Realism'.

Career
Bhaskar, who lectures internationally, has taught at the Universities of Edinburgh, Oxford, Sussex and City University, London. Following the enthusiastic reception of his first two books, Bhaskar founded the Critical Realism Conferences with notable scholars and leading CR writers Andrew Collier, Bill Outhwaite and Ted Benton. He was a founding member of the Centre for Critical Realism and the International Association of Critical Realism. More recently he has held visiting positions in several Scandinavian Universities, and is currently working on the application of CR to Peace Studies.
The first 'phase' of Critical Realism accrued a large number of adherents and proponents in Britain, many of whom were involved with the Radical Philosophy Group and related movements, and it was in the Radical Philosophy Journal that much of the early CR scholarship first appeared. It argued for an objectivist, realist approach to science based on a Kant-style transcendental analysis of scientific experimental activity. Stressing the need to retain both the subjective, epistemological or 'transitive' side of knowledge and the objective, ontological or 'intransitive' side, Bhaskar developed a theory of science and social science which he thought would sustain the reality of the objects of science, and their knowability, but would also incorporate the insights of the 'sociology of knowledge' movement, which emphasised the theory-laden, historically contingent and socially situated nature of knowledge. What emerged was a marriage of ontological realism with epistemological relativism, forming an objectivist, yet fallibilist, theory of knowledge. Bhaskar's main strategy was to argue that reality has depth, and that knowledge can penetrate more or less deeply into reality, without ever reaching the 'bottom'. Bhaskar has said that he reintroduced 'ontology' into the philosophy of science at a time when this was almost heresy, arguing for an ontology of stratified emergence and differentiated structure, which supported the ontological reality of causal powers independent of their empirical effects; such a move opened up the possibility for a non-reductivist and non-positivistic account of causal explanation in the human and social domain.
This explanatory project was linked with a critical project the main idea of which is the doctrine of 'Explanatory Critique' which Bhaskar developed fully in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (1987). This developed the critical tradition of 'ideology critique' within a CR framework, arguing that certain kinds of explanatory accounts could lead directly to evaluations, and thus that science could function normatively, not just descriptively, as positivism has, since Hume's Law, assumed. Such a move, it was hoped, would provide the Holy Grail of critical theory, an objective normative foundation.
The 'second phase' of Critical Realism, the dialectic turn initiated in Dialectic: the Pulse of Freedom (1993) won some new adherents but drew criticism from some Critical Realists. It argued for the 'dialecticising' of CR, through an elaborate reading of Hegel and Marx. Arguing against Hegel and with Marx that dialectical connections, relations and contradictions are themselves ontological - objectively real - Bhaskar developed a concept of real absence which it was claimed could provide a more robust foundation for the reality and objectivity of values and criticism. He attempted to incorporate critical, rational human agency into the dialectic figure with his 'Fourth Dimension' of dialectic, thereby grounding a systematic model for rational emancipatory transformative practice.
In 2000, Bhaskar published From East to West: The Odyssey of a Soul, in which he first expressed ideas related to spiritual values that came to be seen as the beginning of his so-called 'spiritual' turn, which led to the final phase of CR dubbed 'Transcendental Dialectical Critical Realism'. This publication and the ones that followed it were highly controversial and led to something of a split among Bhaskar's proponents. Whilst some respected Critical Realists cautiously supported Bhaskar's 'spiritual turn', others took the view that the development had compromised the status of CR as a serious philosophical movement.
In his Reflections on Meta-Reality, he states:
This book articulates the difference between critical realism in its development and a new philosophical standpoint which I am in the process of developing, which I have called the philosophy of Meta-Reality.
The main departure, it seems, is an emphasis on the shift away from Western dualism to a non-dual model in which emancipation entails "a breakdown, an overcoming, of the duality and separateness between things." However, this move was seen by some to undermine some of early Critical Realisms strongest aspects.

Criticism
Whilst his early books were 'models of clarity and rigour', Bhaskar has been criticized for the "truly appalling style" (Alex Callinicos, 1994) in which his 'dialectical' works are written. Andrew Sullivan mocks him[citation needed] for writing sentences such as:
"Indeed dialectical critical realism may be seen under the aspect of Foucaultian strategic reversal - of the unholy trinity of Parmenidean/Platonic/Aristotelean provenance; of the Cartesian-Lockean-Humean-Kantian paradigm, of foundationalisms (in practice, fideistic foundationalisms) and irrationalisms (in practice, capricious exercises of the will-to-power or some other ideologically and/or psycho-somatically buried source) new and old alike; of the primordial failing of western philosophy, ontological monovalence, and its close ally, the epistemic fallacy with its ontic dual; of the analytic problematic laid down by Plato, which Hegel served only to replicate in his actualist monovalent analytic reinstatement in transfigurative reconciling dialectical connection, while in his hubristic claims for absolute idealism he inaugurated the Comtean, Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean eclipses of reason, replicating the fundament of positivism through its transmutation route to the super-idealism of a Baudrillard."More serious criticisms have been levelled at the substance of Bhaskar's arguments at various points. One objection to Bhaskar's early CR is that it begs the question, assuming, rather than proving, the existence of the intransitive domain. Another objection, raised by Callinicos and others, is that Bhaskar's so-called 'transcendental arguments' are not really any such thing. They are certainly not typical transcendental arguments as philosophers such as Charles Taylor have defined them, the distinguishing feature of which is the identification of some putative condition on the possibility of experience. However his arguments function in an analogous way since they try to argue that scientific practice would be unintelligible and/or inexplicable in the absence of the ontological features he identifies. More serious criticism has been levelled at the dialectical phase of his philosophy, which it has been alleged proves too much, since CR was already dialectical. Bhaskar's concept of real absence has been questioned by, among others, Andrew Collier, who points out that it in fact fails to distinguish properly between real and nominal absences (in "On Real and Nominal Absences", in After Postmodernism, 2001). Bhaskar's most recent 'spiritual' phase has been criticised by many, perhaps most, adherents of early CR for departing from the fundamental positions which made Critical Realism important and interesting, without providing philosophical support for his new ideas.